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I. THE EMPLOYMENT-COST CONUNDRUM 
In the decade since Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (ADA), 1 the practical consequences of Title I have been the subject of 
surprisingly little research.2 This lacuna is especially gaping in view of the 
established field of employment antidiscrimination laws that regularly re-
ceive analytical attention.3 For although the ADA is a comparatively newer 
provision, the ability to extend research models and enquiries to the sizable 
number of Americans that Title I purportedly affects 4 warrants greater at-
tention than has to date been the case. 
The few empirical studies that have been conducted. however. suggest 
two apparently incongruent effects. First, the studies indicate that many of 
the accommodation costs engendered by Title I are generally nonexistent 
or minimal. In fact, they suggest that accommodations can be cost effective 
for the providing employers.5 Second. the overall pos.t-ADA employment 
rate of workers with disabilities has declined significantly relative to that of 
©2000 Michael Ashley Stein. 
• J.D. Harvard, Ph.D. Cambridge University; Assistant Professor, College of William & 
Mary School of Law. Peter Blanck, John Donohue, Christine Jolls, and Mark Kelman were 
generous in providing comments, as were the law school faculty members who participated in 
colloquia at the University oflowa, Stanford University, and the University of Virginia. I also 
benefited gready from presenting this paper as part of the National Instinlte on Disability 
Rehabilitation and Research (NIDRR) Summer 2000 Researchers' Symposium. My research 
was funded through a generous summer stipend provided by the College ofWilliam and Mary 
School of Law. 
1. 42 u.s.c. §§ 12101-12113 (1994). 
2. This shortfall exists despite intra-disability group encouragement. For example, the 
primary reason for organizing the NIDRR Summer Researchers' Symposium, see supra note 0 , 
was "to increase knowledge of research design and med1odology involving workers with dis-
abilities." Peter David Blanck et al., The Emerging Workforce of Entrqrreneurs with Disabilities: 
Preliminary Study of Entrepreneurship in Iou•a, 85 IOWA LAW REV. 1583 (2000) [hereinafter Blanck 
et al., The Emerging Workforce of Entrepreneurs u•ith Disabilities]. This is a recurring theme among 
those interested in disability policy. See NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABIU1Y, ACHIEVING 
INDEPENDENCE: THE CHALLENGE FOR THE 21sr CENTURY-A DI~CADE OF PROGRESS IN 
DISABILITY POLICY, SETfiNG AN AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE 6 (1996) (calling for more practical 
research in order to better evaluate future policy objectives). 
3. Although the literature is too voluminous to list comprehensi•1ely, representative work 
on the effects of civil rights laws on people of color includes John J. Donohue III & James 
Heckman, Continuous Versus Episodic Change: The Impact of Civil Rigllts Policy on the Economic 
Status of Blacks, 29 J. ECON. LIT. 1603 (1991); James J. Heckman & BrookS. Payner, Deter-
mining the Impact of Federal Antidiscrimination Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks: A Study of 
South Carolina, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 138, 167-73 (1989); Richard Buder & James J. Heckman, 
The Government's Impact on the LAbor Market Status of Black Americans: A Critical RevieU', in EQUAL 
RIGHTS AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 235 (Leonard J. Hausman et al. eds., 1977). 
4. The Current Population Survey's disability-related website, http://www.census.gov/ 
hhes/www/disability.html, estimates this gap to include as many as 54 million people. In practi-
cal terms, the Census Bureau classifies nearly twenty percent of Americans as having some 
kind of disability. See CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CENSUS BRIEF 97-5, 
DISABILITIES AFFECT ONE-FIFTH OF ALL AMERICANS, available at http://www.census.gov/prod/ 
3/97pubs/cenbr975.pdf. 
5. These appraisals are addressed infra Pan II. 
EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS OF TITLE I 1673 
workers without disabilities.6 These seemingly antithetical conclusions beg 
an important question: If accommodating disabled workers can be eco-
nomically cost effective for employers, why has an increase in labor market 
participation by such workers not (yet) occurred? 7 
This essay is part of a continuing research agenda proposing different 
approaches to the puzzle of why the overall employment rate of working-
age individuals with disabilities has not increased since Title I's passage.8 
Part II explicates and critiques studies asserting that employers can ac-
commodate disabled workers inexpensively, and perhaps enjoy economic 
benefits as a result. Part III presents and evaluates the primary econometric 
investigations which find that the relative disabled employment rate has 
declined since the ADA's passage-while wages have remained stable or 
improved. Both Parts II and III conclude that neither the conclusions 
reached by these studies, nor my ensuing critiques, are dispositive in the 
absence of additional empirical evidence. 
Lacking categorical evidence, Part IV operates frpm an interim work-
ing assumption that the studies examined in Parts II and III are correct. 
Consequently, it addresses the implications of each set of findings. Part 
IV(A) suggests that the accommodation cost studies, which appraise the 
utility of providing outlays, can be helpful in recalibrating the metric by 
which the economic efficiency of disabled employees is measured. This 
analysis will not result in all accommodations being seen as economically 
net-productive. Considering the impact of these benefits will, however, 
render a more balanced and appropriate calculus. Part IV(B) explores the 
attendant policy implications that can be addressed in light of assessments 
finding that Title I is causing a decline in disabled workers' relative em-
ployment levels. Part IV(B) asserts that continuing the status quo, elimi-
nating the ADA, or replacing the statute completely with tax-and-spend 
subsidies all fail as viable options. Rather, subsidies should supplement the 
input costs of accommodations exceeding the reach of Title I's undue hard-
6. This effect is analyzed in further detail infra Part III. 
7. This question is especially pointed in light of the national unemployment rate having 
plummeted to low single digit rates. See Yochi J. Dreazen, Jobless Rate Stays at 4%, But Fed 
Interest-Rate Rise Is Unlikely, WALLST.J., Aug. 7, 2000, atA2. 
8. Elsewhere I identify a market failure that prevents certain employers from reaching 
rational labor market decisions by creating a "taste for discrimination" in which the costs of 
including people with disabilities in a workforce are perceived as being greater than they really 
are. See generaUy Michael Ashley Stein, Labor Markets, Rationality, and Workn:s with Disabilities, 21 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & L\B. L 314 (2000) [hereinafter Stein, Labor Markets], available at http:// 
www.papers.ssm.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=230799; Michael Ashley Stein, Market Failure and 
ADA Title I, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILmES: ExPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE L\W FOR 
INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS 193, 194 (leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds., 2000). 
I expand my argument that the prevailing labor market model may not be the most appropri-
ate metric for assessing Title I's efficacy below in Parts IV(B)-(C). See also Michael Ashley Stein, 
Employing People with Disabilities: Some Cautionary Thoughts for a Second-Generation Civil Rights 
Statute, in EMPLOYMENT, DISABILITY, AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES Acr: ISSUES IN 
L\W, PUBLIC POLICY, AND RESEARCH 51,53 (Peter David Blanck ed., 2000) [hereinafter Stein, 
Employing People with Disabilities] (counseling that the ADA may not be able to achieve its man-
dates in the absence of governmental enforcement similar to that of Title VII). 
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ship standard. Finally, Part IV(C) suggests that future research assessing 
post-ADA employment effects can be enriched by exploring models of 
workforce participation outside the traditionally utilized labor market 
paradigm. Investigators should examine the influence that extra-legal (or 
"environmental") factors, such as the availability of health care insurance, 
have upon employment effects. They should also explore alternative met-
rics for success, for example the nontraditional employment experiences of 
entrepreneurs ·with disabilities.9 
II. ACCOMMODATION COST STUDIES 
Despite the dearth of research measuring the actual costs of accom-
modating disabled workers, available evidence indicates that many accom-
modation costs are recurrently nonexistent, minimal, or even cost effective 
for the providing employers. 
The leading study, an examination of some 500 accommodations 
made by Sears, Roebuck and Co. from 1978 to 1997, found that the com-
pany provided nearly all of the accommodations at minimal cost. From 
1978-1992 the average out-of-pocket expense for an accommodation 
equaled $121. From 1993-1996 that average dropped to $45. Overall, 72% 
of accommodations required no cost, 17% carried an expenditure of less 
than $100, 10% cost less than $500, and 1% required inputs of between 
$500-$1000.10 The Sears study's results are substantiated by those of the 
Job Accommodation Network GAN), which reported to Congress that the 
typical accommodation cost was $200.1 1 Other appraisals showed similarly 
moderate outlays. 12 Even a pre-ADA survey concluded that the cost of ac-
commodating disabled workers was equal to that of acclimating nondis-
abled workers. 13 
Studies also suggest that employers can capture tangible benefits by 
providing accommodations. One federally funded agency found that for 
9. See generaUy Blanck et al., The Emerging Workforce of Entrepreneurs u.Uh Disabilities, supra 
note 2. 
10. See PETER DAVID BLANCK, COMMUNICATING THE AMERICANS wrrH DISABILITIES ACT, 
TRANSCENDING COMPLIANCE: 1996 FOLLOW· UP REPORT ON SEARS, ROEBUCK AND Co. 42-43 
(Annenberg Washington Program Reports, 1996} [hereinafter BLANCK, COMMUNICATING THE 
ADA]. 
11. See President's Committee on the Employment of People with Disabilities, Report to 
Congress on the Job Accommodation Network (July 26, 1995) (unpublished, on file with the 
Iowa Law Review}. 
12. See, e.g., PETER DAVID BLANCK, THE EMERGING ROLE OF THE STA!'FING INDUSTRY IN 
THE EMPLOYMENT OF PERSONS \VITH DISABILITIES: A CASE REPORT ON MANPOWER INC. {1998) 
[hereinafter BLANCK, THE EMERGING ROLE OF THE STAFFING INDUSTRY] {reporting that ac-
commodation costs were "minimal"); Laura Koss-Feder, Spurred by the Americans uoith Disabilities 
Act, More Finns Take on Those Ready, WiUing and Able to Work, TIME MAG., Jan. 25, 1999 (citing 
James Geletka, Executive Director of the Rehabilitation Engineering and Assistive Technology 
Society of America for the proposition that most worl•place accommodations cost less than 
$200); Rita Thomas Noel, Emplo)ing the Disabled: A How and Why Approach, •!4 TRAINING & 
DEV. J. 26 ( 1990) (reporting that 70-80% of accommodations cost less than $500). 
13. See INT'L CENTER FOR THE DISABLED, THE ICD SURVEY II: EMPLOYING DISABLED 
AMERICANS (Louis Harris & Assoc. Comp., 1987). 
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every dollar spent on accommodation, companies saved $50, on average, in 
net benefits. Thus, although more than one half of accommodations cost 
less than $500, in two thirds of those cases companies enjoyed net benefits 
exceeding $5000.14 Another survey reported that accommodati<?_ns reduced 
employee replacement costs by reducing costly job turnover. Io Empirical 
evidence indicates that disabled workers have absenteeism rates equal to or 
lower than their nondisabled peers.16 Accordingly, existing quantitative 
data ·demonstrate that employers can internalize economic benefits in the 
form of savings in recruitment, training, and replacement expenses by pro-
viding accommodations to their disabled workers. 17 
In addition to these readily calculable benefits, Peter Blanck describes 
"ripple effects" that emanate from accommodations. 18 These include eco-
nomic benefits that may be difficult to quantify initially, but which are 
eventually internalized b6 employers. Among such desirable consequences 
are higher productivity/ greater dedication,20 and better identification of 
qualified candidates for promotion.21 Employers also enjoy fewer insurance 
claims and reduced post-injury rehabilitation costs,22 an improved corpo-
14. See President's Committee on the Employment of People with Disabilities, Report to 
Congress on the Job Accommodation Network (July 26, 1995) (unpublished, on file with the 
Iowa Law Review); see also James G. Frierson, The Legality of Medical Exams and Health Histories 
of Current Employees Under the Americans uoith Disabilities Act, 17 J. REHABILITATION ADMIN. 83, 
86 (1993) (describing how one company saved $4 million, and another $310,000 annually by 
providing necessary accommodations). 
15. Blanck reported that 60% of disabled workers remained in their jobs, as opposed to 
40% of able-bodied ones. Moreover, the cost of each job turnover averaged $2800. See 
BLANCK, COMMUNICATING THE ADA, supra note 10, at 29. 
16. See, e.g., Gretchen Adams-Shollenberger & Thomas E. Mitchell, A Comparison of Jani-
torial Workers uoith Mental Retardation and Their Non-Disabled Peers on Retention and Absenteeism, J. 
REHABILITATION, July-Sept. 1996, at 56; Dolores Ondusko, Comparison of Employees uoith Dis-
abilities and Able-Bodied Workers in Janitorial Maintenance, J. APPLIED REHABILITATION 
COUNSELING, Summer 1991, at 19-24; Rick A Lester & Donald W. Caudill, The Handicapped 
Worker: Seven Myths, 41 TRAINING & DEV.J., Aug. 1987, at 50-5l;J.E. Martin etal., Work Atten-
dance in Competitive Employment: Comparison Between Employees Who Are Non-Handicapped and 
Those Who Are Mentally Retarded, 23 MENTAL RETARDATION 142-47 (1985). 
17. This assertion is made with less qualification in Peter David Blanck & Mollie Weigh-
ncr Marti, Attitude, Behavior, and the Employment Provisions of the Americans uoith Disabilities Act, 42 
VILL L. REV. 345, 378 (1997), and in Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the Employment 
Provisions of the Americans uoith Disabilities Act: Part /-Workplace Accommodations, 46 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 887, 902 (1997). 
18. See BLANCK, THE EMERGING ROLE OF THE STAFFING INDUSTRY, supra note 12, at 29. 
19. "Savvy employers have figured out that a can-do attitude for employees with impair-
ments is good for profits and productivity." Patricia M. Owens, Employee Disabilities Needn't 
Impair Profits, WALLST.J.,June 7, 1999, atA22. 
20. See, e.g., Stuart Silverstein, Work & Careers: On the Job uoith More Help from Neu• Technol-
ogy, More Disabled Join the Work Force, L.A TIMES, Oct. 25, 1998, at C5 (relating EarthLink's 
vice president as saying, "What you find are employees who probably are more focused and 
more dedicated to doing quality work."). 
21. Thomas W. Hale, Howard V. Hayghe, & John M. McNeil, Persons uoith Disabilities: 
l.abor Market Activity, 1994, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Sept. 1998, at 3 (relating that the disabled 
are less likely to work in high paying positions relative to nondisabled). 
22. See BLANCK, COMMUNICATING THE ADA, supra note 10, at 26-27. 
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rate culture, 23 and more widespread use by non disabled workers of effi-
ciency-enhancing technologies previously utilized exclusively by their dis-
abled peers?4 
In addition to these ripple effects, accommodations also result in 
"positive externalities," which may, in turn, benefit employers, but that are 
even more difficult to quantify. One such externality is public cost savings, 
including reduction of disability-related public assistance obligations cur-
rently estimated at $120 billion annually. 25 Although studies show that 
hiring people with disabilities can lower taxpayers' general burdens26 and 
benefit the national economx. 27 specific effects upon individual employers 
as taxpayers remains unclear.28 
By offering concrete illustrations of benefits that employers can cap-
ture by providing accommodations, the studies described above lend clarity 
to a subject that commentators have disputed in the legal literature exclu-
sively b~ conjecture since well before Title I's regulations became fully ef-
fective. 9 Thus, the investigations provide a glimpse into the realities of a 
complex subject that has been critiqued only from a single (albeit tradition-
ally recognized and often valuable) vantage point.30 
23. See id. at 8. 
24. For instance, the nonvisually impaired employees of a large insurance company as-
similated voice-recognition technology originally provided as an accommodation. See Heidi M. 
Berven & Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the Americans with Disabilities Act Part II: Patents 
and Innovations in Assistive Technology, 12 NOTRE DAME J.L ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 9, 85-89 
(1998) (discussing faults of cost-benefit paradigms in determing whether employers suffer 
undue hardship and explaining the "ripple effect") 
25. See DAVID I. LEVINE, REINVENTING DISABILITY POLICY 1 (Inst. of Indus. Relations, 
Working Paper No. 65, 1997). One report estimated that for every one million disabled peo-
ple employed, there would be as much as a $21.2 billion annual increase in earned income, a 
$2.1 billion decrease in means-tested cash income payments, a $286 million annual decrease 
in the use offood stamps, a $1.8 billion decrease in Supplemental Security Income payments, 
284,000 fewer people using Medicaid and 166,000 fewer people using Medicare. See People 
u•ith Disabilities Shou• What They Can Do, HUM. RESOURCES, June 1998, at 144 (citing Rutgers 
University economist Douglas Kruse). 
26. See, e.g., The JWOD Program: Providing Cost Savings to the Federal Gat•ernment by Em-
plojing People u•ith Disabilities (Feb. 6, 1998) (listing survey results and reporting that the federal 
government saved $1,963,206 over the course of the study by employing 270 people with 
disabilities) (on file with the Iowa Law Review); Taxpayer Return Study California Department of 
Rehabilitation Mental Health Cooperative Programs (Oct. 1995) (finding that for every disabled 
person employed, California taxpayers saved an average of $629 per month in costs) (on file 
with the Iowa Law Review). 
27. See generally Thomas N. Chirakos, Aggregate Economic Losses from Disability in the United 
Stales: A Preliminary Assay, 67 MILBANK Q. 59 (Supp. 2, pt. 1, 1989). 
28. As of this writing, I am unaware of any published research addressing this issue, thus 
substantiating the assertion made above in the text accompanying supra notes 1-4. 
29. RICHARD EPSTEIN issued the earliest challenge in FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE 
AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 480-94 (1992). 
30. That is not to say that such a vantage point lacks value. Abstract appraisals of the 
positive and normative effects of legislation are an accepted function within the fields of law 
and economics and policy analysis, and can provide much insight into effects of social engi-
neering that are frequently difficult to quantifY. When empirical evidence is readily discern-
able, however, it yields greater clarity to abstruse issues. · 
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While the studies discussed above are informative, reliance upon these 
findings requires a great deal of caution. The conclusions drawn from over-
all studies of specific corporations, such as Sears or Manpower (as well as 
narrow cohorts from a variety of corporations by JAN), may not be repre-
sentative of other enterprises. Corporate cultures and economies differ 
between establishments. Therefore, results are not likely to be representa-
tive if unexamined enterprises are dissirm1ar in size or economic prowess, 
or engage in unrelated business activities. Hence, it may be inaccurate to 
extrapolate very small sample group results from particular enterprises 
onto corporations in general. The studies do not report the costs of sought-
after accommodations that were ultimately not provided, presumably due 
to expense considerations. Moreover, although the JAN and Manpower 
studies were conducted post-ADA, the majority of the accommodations 
reviewed in the Sears study were. provided before Title I's enactment.31 
Consequently, the median cost of accommodations, whether in single enti-
ties like Sears or presented in the aggregate by JAN, might be meaningfully 
higher than those reported. Finally, the studies focus on "hard" costs: ex-
penses engendered by altering physical plant, for example by providing 
visual aides. Such studies do not adequately appraise "soft" costs, including 
nonphysical plant expenses, such as educating human resource personnel. 
Because soft cost outlays can be significant, or even predominant, the actual 
costs of accommodation might be greater than those described by the above 
analyses. . 
Ultimately, the accuracy of the few studies assessing the costs of pro-
viding accommodations to disabled workers have to be verified, refuted, or 
further debated through subsequent empirical testing. Until such data be-
come available, however, it is fair and efficacious to give these studies' re-
sults some weight when considering the economic efficiency of Title !-
mandated accommodations. Part IV(A) discusses the practical implications 
of according gravity to these studies. 
III. EMPLOYMENT AND WAGE EFFECT STUDIES 
Economists Thomas DeLeire of the University of Chicago32 and Daron 
Acemoglu and Joshua Angrist of the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology33 conducted two compreh!insive empirical studies of the post-
ADA employment effects on workers with disabilities. These two studies 
concurred in finding a relative reduction in the employment rate of dis-
31. This raises again the issue of voluntary compliance with respect to accommodation 
costs. Blanck responds to this criticism by asserting that the impetus to noncompulsory ac-
commodation "appears to have more to do with corporate cultures, attitudes, and business 
strategies than with meeting the ADA's minimal obligations." See Blanck eta!., The Emerging 
Workforce of Entrepreneurs uoith Disabilities, supra note 2, at 1634. 
32. Thomas DeLeire, The Wage and Employment Effects of the Americans uoith Disabilities Act, 
HUM. RESOURCES (forthcoming 2000 or 2001). 
33. See DARON ACEMOGLU & JOSHUA ANCRIST, CONSEQUENCES OF EMPLOYMENT 
PROTECTION? THE CASE OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES Acr (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. 
Research Working Paper No. 6670, 1998). 
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abled workers concurrent with either a neutral or beneficial effect on wages. 
These studies also employ harmonious frameworks to explain their results. 
DeLeire utilized data panels of men aged 18-64 from the Study of In-
come and Program Participation (SIPP) over the period 1986-1993. 
DeLeire concluded that the ADA's passage resulted in an average 7.2% 
decrease in the employment levels of disabled men relative to that of non-
disabled men.34 Over the same time, DeLeire reported no relative change 
in disabled workers' relative earnings.35 
Acemoglu and Angrist's results, culled from the 1988-1997 Current 
Population Study (CPS) data for both men and women aged 21-58, gener-
ally corroborate those of DeLeire but provide more nuanced detail. Ace-
moglu and Angrist found that across the 21-39 age cohort, the relative em-
ployment levels of workers with disabilities declined by 10-15% with respect 
to hours worked per week.36 For the 40-58 age group, rney concluded that 
there was no effect upon disabled women relative to their nondisabled 
peers.37 However, men's employment levels decreased significantly.38 The 
relative wage levels of workers with disabilities remained unchanged. 39 
An important article by Christine J oils supports both studies' empirical 
findings.40 Jolls identifies the circumstances under which an accommoda-
tion mandate is theoretically likely to reduce a given group's employment 
level or wages, the conditions under which both are prone to be reduced, 
and those under which neither is likely to occur. The degree to which anti-
discrimination restrictions on employment and wage differentials are apt to 
bind both accommodated and nonaccommodated groups is pivotal to 
Jolls's model.41 Within the context of disabled workers, Jolls posits that 
restrictions on employment differentials are unlikely to be binding, while 
restrictions on wage differentials are likely to bind. Thus, Jolls's model pre-
dicts that Title I's reasonable accommodation mandates will reduce the 
relative employment rate of workers with disabilities while either increasing 
their wage levels or leaving them unchanged.42 
As with the accommodation cost studies, DeLeire's and Acemoglu and 
Angrist's findings offer important insights into the practical effects of a 
statute that has not been examined adequately for its pragmatic implica-
tions. Jolls's theoretical framework bolsters these findings. Nevertheless, 
the accuracy of the post-ADA emplolment and wage effect studies can be 
challenged for a number of reasons.4 
34· DeLeire, supra note 32, at 12. 
35. See id. 
36. See ACEMOGLU & ANGRIST, supra note 33, at tbl.2. 
37. See id. at 2. 
38. See id. at 17. 
39. Jd. at 12. 
40. See Christine jolls, Accommodation Mand:ztes, 53 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001), at 
http://papers.ssm.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=230 148 (emphasizing the economic parallels 
between accommodation mandates and antidiscrimination law). 
41. See id. at Part I. 
42. See id. at Pan II. 
43. A thorough technical questioning is put forward in Susan Schwochau & Peter David 
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Four arguments initially suggest that the empirical studies may under-
estimate Title I's impact. Composite Census data indicates a modest rise in 
the overall disabled employment rate during the 1991-1994 period.44 That 
is overshadowed, however, by an t;levation in the employme~t rate of the 
comparable nondisabled cohort.43 Moreover, the conclusions presented 
may be precipitate because Title I's regulations did not become ~lly effec-
tive for employers of fifteen or more workers until July 1994.'16 Alterna-
tively, the general downturn in the U.S. economy in the early 1990s might 
account for the hiring discrepancy.47 Finally, other factors exogenous to the 
statute, such as the absence of job training programs and incentives for 
those with disabilities comparable to those directed at other groups histori-
cally dependent on public assistance, advance plausible alternate explana-
tions for the conclusions reached. 48 
The empirical findings also can be contested based on the authors' 
technique for appraising the scope of the "disabled" cohort. Criticisms 
similarly arise from the implications the~ placed on that type of classifica-
tion for the purposes of measurement.4 Both studies rely upon data sets 
gathered from individual responses to the question of whether a respon-
dent has "a health problem or a disability which prevents him/her from 
working or which limits the kind or amount of work he/she can do."50 Util-
izing this question to garner a cohort raises several concerns. The first con-
siders whether relatively more people self-identified as disabled after Con-
gress passed the statute, resulting in a concurrent decrease of relative em-
Blanck, The Economics of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Part Ill: Does the ADA Disable the Dis-
abled?, 21 BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L 271 (2000). 
44. The Census reported that the general employment rate of disabled individuals aged 
sixteen to sixty-four improved 0.3%, rising from 52.0% in 1991 to 52.3% in 1994. See Current 
Population Survey, supra note 4, at 2. 
45. The number of employed people without disabilities increased 1.6%, from 80.5% in 
1991 to 82.1% in 1994. !d. See also Stein, Employing People uoith Disabilities, supra note 8, at 52. 
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (1994) (providing that the subchapter becomes effective 
July 26, 1992). Compounding this timeframe selection concern is Acemoglu and Angrist's 
study of the comparative change in disabled employment between small- and medium-sized 
firms at a time when many of the former were not bound by the law. See ACEMOGLU & 
.ANGRIST, supra note 33, at 21 (noting that small firms may not be bound by the provisions of 
Title I even today). -
47. Acknowledging this possibility, Del.eire found the economy to be a mitigating-but 
unconvincing-factor. See Del.eire, supra note 32, at 13 (noting that nationwide employment 
declines may have had a mitigating effect on the hiring discrepancy). Acemoglu and Angrist 
do not address the issue. 
48. The employment and wage studies acknowledge the possible effects of benefits poli-
cies but fail to address the attendant question of incentives to leave public assistance. The 
neglected relationship between environmental factors and work policy incentives is elaborated 
upon infra Part IV(C). 
49. For examples of authors doing this see ALBERTO MARTINI, WHY EsTIMATES OF THE 
NUMBER OF PERSONS WITH DISABILmES WHO WANT TO WORK DIVERGE SO WIDELY (Mathe-
matica Pol'y Research Paper No. 7984-001, 1991); Saad Z. Nagi, The Concept and Measurement 
of Disability, in DISABILITY POLICIES AND GoVERNMENT PROGRAMS 1 (Edward D. Berkowitz ed., 
1979). 
50. ACEMOGLU & .AN GRIST, supra note 33, at 9. 
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ployment levels. 51 Alternatively, those who self-identify as disabled may not 
necessarily fit within definitions expressed in recent Supreme Court deci-
sions. 52 On a deeper level, utilizing composite cohorts that fail to account 
for type or severity of disability raises issues about whether these empirical 
studies analyzed the most appropriate group of people with disabilities. 53 
Self-identified cohort data in the aggregate does not address valid concerns 
about the existence of "cream-skimminJf (a practice in which employers 
hire workers with minimal disabilities), or the possibility that some em-
. ployers may hire only those disabled individuals who require the least ex-
pensive accommodations.55 Because they lack nuance regarding disability 
characteristics, these data sets also do not address the possibility that, as a 
result of either irrationality or calculated cost-savings, employers resist 
bringiJ!& unemployed workers with existing disabilities into their labor 
forces.:> 
The accuracy of the two post-ADA employment and wage effect studies 
will only become clear after further empirical testing. In the interim, how-
ever, it is expedient to defer to these studies. Nonetheless, the results raise 
policy concerns of what response, if any, society should make to an appar-
ently ineffectual antidiscrimination law. Part IV(B) addresses this question. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS 
Parts II and III concluded that, in the absence of additional deter-
mining empirical evidence, neither the conclusions reached by the accom-
modation cost and employment and wage effects studies, nor their ensuing 
critiques, can be viewed as conclusive. Accordingly, Parts IV(A)-(B) operate 
from a working assumption that both sets of studies are correct-or at least 
illustrative-when assessing the implications for each set of findings. Mov-
ing away from the traditional labor market paradigm, Part IV(C) offers a 
precis for future empirical research utilizing alternative models to assess 
post-ADA employment effects upon workers with disabilities. 
51. Acemoglu and Angrist concede this possibility, but then account for it by correlating 
1993 and 1994 self-identification data. See id. at 12-13. Since both CPS panels are post-ADA, 
this seems to beg the point. 
52. For example, the contact-lens-wearing twins not held to be disabled in Sutton v. United 
Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999), might self-identifY as disabled, while the person with asympto-
matic HIV found to be disabled in Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998), might not. 
53. The further implications of selecting research paradigms are addressed infra Part 
IV(C). 
54. See generaUy Richard V. Burkhauser et al., How People urilh Disabilities Fare When Public 
Policies Change, 12J. PoL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 251 (1993). 
55. See generaUy 1110mas N. Chirikos, WUl the Costs of Accommodating Work..or.s urilh Disabilities 
Remain Low? 17 BEHAV. SCI. & L 93 (1999); 111omas N. Chirikos, The Economics ofEmpluyment, 
69 MILBANKQ. 150 (1991). 
56. The argument is that the actual or perceived cost of accommodating existing workers 
with disabilities acts as a deterrent against hiring new employees with disabilities. See Stein, 
Labor Markets, supra note 8. 
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A. IMPUCATIONS FROM ACCOMMODATION COST STUDIES 
Accepting the accommodation cost studies as accurate-or, at a mini-
mum, illuminating-they afford a new template by which to assess the rela-
tive economic efficiency of providing workplace accommodations to em-
ployees with disabilities.57 Current economically based legal analyses of 
Title I, as expressed by law and economics commentators, begin fri)m the 
assumption that disabled workers cost more to employ than their nondis-
abled counterparts. This postulate derives from the neoclassical economic 
labor market model's tautological premise that rational decision-makers 
will always make the most cost-effective, efficient choices. Under this the-
ory, workers with disabilities must be more expensive than those without 
disabilities because otherwise rational employers would have hired and re-
tained those workers. Specifically, the paradigm posits that, in the context 
of a rational labor market, employers hire workers with the greatest net 
productivity. This utility is calculated by subtract_ing total labor cost from 
total production benefit. Because employers with rational self-interest have 
logically chosen employees without disabilities, it stands to reason that dis-
abled workers require costly inputs in the form of accommodation costs. 
Underlying this postulate are several suppositions. Employees with dis-
abilities are naturally less productive than their counterparts without dis-
abilities. Moreover, disabled workers require accommodations which are 
inherently costly. 58 Because these factors work together to make the hiring 
of a worker with disabilities cost-ineffective, the intrinsic costs of employing 
disabled workers acts as a deterrent to their inclusion in the labor market, 
especially at entry. Thus, Title I is inexorably doomed. 59 
The prevailing mode of economic analysis is incomplete because it 
only considers internalized costs associated with workplace accommoda-
tions. By contrast, a properly balanced analysis of Title I should take into 
account positive benefits flowing from disabled employment, both those 
directly internalized and those arising through externalities. As set forth in 
the accommodation cost studies, these benefits can involve increased pro-
ductivity, lower absenteeism rates, and fewer training and replacement 
costs. Weighting this type of data-as well as future studies that include 
equivalent soft costs-would properly recalibrate the metric by which the 
economic efficiency of workers with disabilities is reckoned. Considering 
the impact of these and similar benefits (and costs) will not show all ac-
commodations to be net-productive. However, it will render a more bal-
anced and appropriate calculus. 60 
57. Unless otherwise indicated, these assertions appear in Stein, lAbor Markets, supra note 
8. 
58. !d. In FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 29, at 480-94, Richard Epstein asserts that the 
"awkward" and "unpleasant" reactions of coworkers and customers to employees with disabili-
ties extracts yet a further cost. 
59. See generally Stein, lAbor Markets, supra note 8. 
60. !d. 
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B. IMPliCATIONS FROM EMPLOYMENT AND WAGE EFFECT STUDIES 
Accepting the accuracy of the employment and wage effect findings 
compels an exploration of the policy implications of what the appropriate 
social response, if any, should be to an ostensibly ineffectual antidiscrimi-
nation law.61 In a provocative book, Mark Kelman discusses the potential 
avenues through which societies can respond to historical inequities. 62 E.x-
trapolating Kelman's ex ante framework td the existing antidiscrimination 
prohibition, the available options are: (a) inaction (in this case, repealing 
existing legislation and returning the labor market to its previous status 
quo condition), (b) regulation (here, continuing with existing antidiscrimi-
nation legislation in unaltered form), or (c) tax-and-spend programs (i.e., 
initiating subsidy programs in lieu of present regulation). 63 Each of these 
options raises an array of difficulties. 64 
A return to an unregulated (or "natural) market equilibrium, as Rich-
ard Epstein (rather than Kelman) suggests, 6:> would only sanction and per-
petuate the irrational biases the ADA was designed to correct. This is true 
for a number of reasons. First, labor markets have never been demon-
strated, either empirically or anecdotally, to have acted rationally with re-
gard to nonmajority group members. Hence, no evidence supports Ep-
stein's notion that eliminating an antidiscrimination norm will yield greater 
rationality to the employment sphere. Second, labor markets do not func-
tion nearly as well as other markets, such as capital markets, where infor-
mation is freely disseminated, as well as systemically disclosed, through 
governmentally enforced regulations.66 This is particularly certain with 
regard to a market failure in which the costs of including people with dis-
61. The arguments that follow are dravm from a work in progress: Michael Ashley Stein, 
Title I as Antidiscrimination (on file with author). Contrary to popular perspective, the article 
asserts that the ADA's function as an antidiscrimination law is consistent with existing regula-
tions (such as Title VII), the statutes differing only in the magnitude of their associated input 
costs. In support of this assertion, I offer economic, prudential, and sociological justifications 
for why it is appropriate to pass accommodations expenses onto employers through Title l's 
mandates rather than spreading these costs across the general tax base by enacting tax-and-
spend provisons. 
62. See MARK KELMAN, STRATEGY OR PRINCIPLE? THE CHOICE BETWEEN REGULATION 
AND T,\XATION 81-94 ( 1999) (hereinafter KELMAN, STRATEGY OR PRINCIPLE?). 
63. See id. at 81-94. Kelman also discusses the possibility of exacting user fees from indi-
viduals who receive certain services, for example from those who utilize the national parks, to 
preserve the availability of these services for nonusers. Within the ADA context, such a scheme 
would require disabled workers who benefited as the result of subsidies paid to their employers 
to pay a tax on those subsidies to support future recipients. Kelman does not address this last 
option, probably because these subsidies do not exist. Finally, Kelman remains agnostic as 
benveen regulation and tax-and-spend programs. 
64. Not featured in Kelman's analysis, and well beyond the scope of this essay, are the 
countless possible legislative emendations ofTitle I and their ramifications. 
65. Epstein advocates repeal of the ADA, as well as all other antidiscrimination legisla-
tion. See EPSTEIN, supra note 29, passim. 
66. John Donohue makes this point nicely in Employment Discrimination lAu• in Perspective: 
Three Concepts of Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2583 (1994). 
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abilities in a workforce are perceived as being greater than they really are. 67 
Third, applying the neoclassical economic model conceivably would compel 
disabled workers to underbid the value of their services in order to subsi-
dize workplace accommodations, whether of a hard or soft variety. 68 As a 
result, the disabled would be discouraged from investing in their own hu-
man capital and be further segregated from mainstream society.69 In sum, 
eliminating the ADA would only promote irrationalities that already exist in 
the employment decisionmaking process. 
Staying the present course without further action could engender two 
propitious effects described in the context of other civil rights legislation. It 
might, as Lauren Edelman argues, create an environment that institution-
alizes compliance through gradual ritualization.70 Alternatively, it might, as 
John Donohue avers, precipitate the sEeed by which social exclusions are 
eventually (or conceivably) remedied. 11 Nevertheless, the disabled face 
unique civil rights chronology. As a group, they were legally empowered 
prior to the emergence of a general social consciousness recognizing why 
such empowerment was needed. 72 Therefore, it is arguable whether legisla-
tion can be efficacious in the absence of exogenous factors, such as rigorous 
governmental enforcement. 73 
Shifting from an antidiscrimination norm to one of strictly tax-and-
spend subsidies has three deleterious effects. First, reliance on subsidies 
would reinforce existing stereotypes about the disabled by augmenting the 
notion that providing them opportunities is a matter of charity (the "medi-
cal" model) rather than one of equality (the "civil rights" or "minority 
67. See generally Stein, Labor Markets, supra note 8 (assessing the argument about the inef-
ficiency of employing workers with disabilities); cf. Daniel R. Fischel, Labor Markets and Labor 
Law Compared with Capital Markets and Corporate Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1061 (1984) (explain-
ing some differences between labor and corporate law, and between labor and capital records). 
Of note is a Yale economist's recent book asserting that the stock market, where vigorous 
trading of securities should yield objective values, is acting in an illogical manner. See ROBERT 
J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2000). Shiller's book supports my general premise: If 
the securities market can badly misprice its own commodities, then surely mistakes can be 
made about the value of selected workers in the far less perfect labor market. 
68. I add the qualification because, although the neoclassical labor market model posits 
this occurrence, no evidence supports its existence during the pre-ADA period or otherwise. 
See generally Stein, Labor Markets, supra note 8. 
69. See id. 
70. See Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structure-Organizational Medica-
tion of Civil Rights Lau•, 97 AM.]. Soc. 1531, 1545 (1992) (arguing that organizations create 
affirmative action structures to secure legitimacy and reduce the risk of suit). 
71. See generally John J. Donohue III, Prohibiting Sex Discrimination in the Workplace: An 
Economic Perspective, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1337 (1989);JohnJ. Donohue III, Is Title VII Efficient?, 
134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411 (1986). 
72. See generally Michael Ashley Stein, From Crippled to Disabled: The Legal Empou•erment of 
Americans With Disabilities, 43 EMORY L.J. 245 (1994) (contrasting the national passion fueling 
the civil rights statutes with the lack of such sentiment surrounding the enactment of the 
ADA). 
73. See generally Stein, Employing People with Disabilities, supra note 8 (drawing parallels to 
the advancement of African-Americans and the literature which demonstrates that federal 
enforcement of Title VII accounted for their improvement). 
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group" model). 74 Second, funding initiatives exclusively through subsidies 
also raises prudential and political questions about the validity of treating 
the disabled in a manner preferable to other historically _disempowered 
groups, for instance the socio-economically disadvantaged. 7:> Third, utiliz-
ing regulation instead of tax-and-spend subsidies can be more efficient. 
While subsidies can balance out only existing market inefficiencies, regula-
tions can also preclude those inefficient practices from repeating. 76 
A preferable option to the three extrapolated from Kelman's frame-
work would use regulation in conjunction with subsidies to target workers 
with disabilities who require accommodations beyond the reach of Title I's 
undue hardship standard. Providing for extra-reasonable accommodations 
could overcome existing market inequities borne by the most stigmatized 
among the disabled. Such provisions also enculturate employers-and 
through the workplace, society at large-about other members of a socially 
marginalized group. Although not without potential difficulties,77 this al-
ternative is also preferable because it reaps the benefits of tax-and-spend 
subsidies while retaining the civil rights model dynamic of existing regula-
tions. 
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Future research assessing post-ADA employment effects on workers 
with disabilities would benefit from examining aspects of employment pol-
icy beyond the traditional labor market paradigm. These considerations 
include the influence of external factors on the ADA's efficacy, as well as the 
14. See generaUy RICHARD K. SCOTCH, FROM GooD WILL TO CIVIL RIGIITS: 
TRANSFORMING FEDERAL DISABILilY POLICY 111-16 (1984) (describing the shift in federal 
policy dynamics from charitable benefits to equal rights); Jonathan C. Drimmer, Cripples, 
Overcomers, and Civil Rights: Tracing the Evolution of Federal Legislation and Social Policy for People 
u•ith Disabilities, 40 UCLA L REV. 1341 (1993) (discussing how the "civil rights" model focuses 
on the social barriers faced by disabled people). For a cross-historical perspective on public 
attitudes towards Americans with disabilities, see generally Peter David Blanck, Civil War Pen-
sions, Civil Rights, and the Americans u•ith Disabilities Act: Empirical Study (1862-1907, 1990-2000) 
62 OHIO. ST. LJ. (forthcoming 2001); Peter David Blanck & Michael Millender, Before Disabil-
ity Civil Rights: Civil War Pensions and the Politics of Disability in Amerio.z, 52 ALA. L REV. (forth-
coming 2000). · 
75. See generaUy KELMAN, STRATEGY OR PRJNCIPLE?, supra note 62. This question receives 
detailed treatment in MARK KELMAN & GILLIAN LESTER, JUMPING THE QUEUE .(1997). Al-
though I do not agree with Kelman's position, responding to his arguments is beyond the 
scope of this essay. 
76. Cf. ALBERTO MARTINI & SHARON ARNOLD, PROGRAMS PROVIDING SUBSIDIZED 
EMPLOYMENT TO DISADVANTAGED WORKERS: A REVIEW OF THEIR EFFECfiVENESS (Mathematica 
Pol'y Research Paper No. 7725-400, 1990) (reporting findings that programs subsidizing 
disabled workers are inefficacious). 
77. For instance, workers with disabilities and their potential employers could contrive to 
depict reasonable accommodations as extra-reasonable, thus shifting costs to the state that 
employers would otherwise bear. CJ. Stewart J. Schwab & Steven L. Willbom, Reasonable Ac-
commodation of Workplace Disabilities 60-62 (March 2000), available at http://www.people.virginia. 
edu!-jhv3q!ADA_Conference/schwab_and_willbom.pdf (suggesting that employees with dis-
abilities can force employers to bear reasonable accommodation costs they are not otherwise 
obligated to pay under the ADA by agr~ing to pay extra-reasonable costs themselves). 
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use of alternative measures by which to gauge Title I's success. 
1. Environmental Factors 
1685 
Legal, political, and economic examinations of post-ADA employment 
effects upon disabled workers generally fail to appreciate the connection 
between increased labor market participation and environmental factors 
exogenous to the statute. These latter considerations include the availability 
of health care, accessibility of public transportation, existence of job train-
ing programs, the extent to which governmental agencies are committed to 
enforcing antidiscrimination provisions, and the consequences of employer 
attitudes and public opinion toward people with disabilities. 
This shortcoming is particularly noteworthy in the legal literature 
where the ADA's significance almost wholly overshadows other factors. For 
example, although Jolls makes an innovative contribution to existing lit-
erature, 78 the degree to which antidiscrimination restrictions on employ-
ment and wage differentials are apt to bind both accommodated and non-
accommodated groups is crucial to her model. 79 This is an entirely valid 
point of departure, and contributions to legal analysis that build on Jails's 
work should be encouraged. Nevertheless, it does not sufficiently account 
for factors beyond the realm oflaw. 80 
By the same token, national policymakers have, until recently, over-
looked the correlation between environmental factors and labor market 
participation. This is so despite the ADA's legislative findings that report in 
detail on the systematic exclusion of disabled people from the workplace-
as well as society at lar~e-and express Congress's intention to bring about 
their full participation. 1 Nevertheless, it has only been the last few years 
that have seen policy makers acknowledge the role of environmental factors 
in fostering integration. In 1998, eight years after the ADA's passage, the 
Presidential Task Force on Employment of Adults with Disabilities recog-
nized the importance of environmental factors and exhorted the President 
to develop responsive policy initiatives. 82 A 1999 Department of Labor re-
port encouraged greater dialogue on the issue of extra-legal ways to pro-
mote greater labor market participation among disabled workers. 83 Later 
that year Congress passed the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Im-
78. The existing literature assumes the binding character of antidiscrimination regula-
tions, and fails to disaggregate the effects of accommodation mandates between accommo-
dated and nonaccommodated groups. See Jolls, supra note 40; text accompanying supra notes 
40-43. 
79. See id. at Part I (proposing that existing models describing economic effects of ac-
commodation mandates fail to consider simultaneous effects on both groups). 
80. See id. at Part II (proposing that issues such as workers' gender be considered). 
81. See ADA, Findings and Purposes, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994). 
82. See Report of the Presidential Task Force on Employment of Adults with Disabilities, 
Re-Charting the Course ( 1998), http://www.dol.gov/doV _ sec/public/programs/ptfead/rechart/ 
sat5PTFEADfmalwp.htm. 
83. The full text of the report is available online. DEP'T OF lABOR, FtrrUREWORK: TRENDS 
AND CHALLENGES FOR THE 21.,. CENTURY, http://www.dol.gov/doVasp/public/futurework/report. 
htm. 
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provement Act, which extended the length of time that people with dis-
abilities receiving public assistance could continue to receive health care 
coverage after obtaining gainful employment. 84 Coinciding with the tenth 
anniversary of the ADA, on July 26, 2000, the Clinton Administration an-
nounced a series of policy initiatives intended to allow people with disabili-
ties currently receiving Social Security disability-related benefits to earn 
more income without losing cash benefits. 85 
Two notable exceptions to the general neglect of extra-legal influences 
upon post-ADA employment effects are the respected work of economists 
Marjorie Baldwin and Richard Burkhauser. Baldwin and her colleagues 
conducted quantitative studies86 into the existence and effects of employer 
prejudice upon the wage and employment levels of disabled Americans. 
These studies revealed that in 1990, men with disabilities lost income 
amounting to $11 billion dollars. Most of these losses were attributable to 
employer prejudice and were distributed unevenly among different types of 
disabilities. 87 Baldwin asserts that Title I is unlikely to bring about a sub-
stantial increase in disabled workers' employment rates because the ADA 
does not adequately take into account the influence of prej'gdice. 88 Burk-
hauser criticized the ADA's lack of conjoined work initiatives by contrasting 
various European policies directed toward "transferring" people with dis-
84. Section 202(a), for example, extends Medicare coverage for SSDI recipients returning 
to work to six and a half years. See Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act, Pub. 
L. 106-170, 113 Stat. 1860 ( 1999). 
85. Full details of the increase in the allowable substantial gainful activity level (SGA) 
under Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) are 
set forth in a White House press release. See Press Release, White House, Clinton-Gore Ad-
ministration Announces New Action Promoting Home and Community Based SeiVices and 
Housing Options for People with Disabilities Quly 25, 2000), http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/ 
uri-res/I2R?um:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/2000/7125/10.text.l. Further information on SGA and 
trial work period changes are available through the Social Security Administration's website at 
http://www.ssa.gov/pressoffice/newsga.htm. 
Ironically,just as American policymakers have begun to examine the type of supplemental 
work initiatives utilized by certain European countries, the European Disability Forum is 
lobbying the European Union to promulgate an antidiscrimination employment provision 
modelled after Title I. As proposed, this provision would operate in addition to whatever tax-
and-spend subsidies the fifteen countries of the Union individually furnish. The Forum's 
website can be accessed in English at http://www.edf-feph.org/en!mdataen.html. 
86. By contrast, and worth noting, are the qualitative writings on this issue by Harlan 
Hahn, for example Antidiscrimination Lau•s and Social Research on Disability: The Minority Group 
Perspective, 14 BEHAV. SCI. & L 41 (1996) (emphasizing the influence of aesthetic anxiety in 
erecting attitudinal barriers to disabled integration). 
87. See Marjorie L. Baldwin & William G. Johnson, Labor Market Discrimination Against 
Men u•ith Disabilities in the Year of the ADA, 66 So. ECON. J. 548 (2000) [hereinafter Baldwin & 
Johnson, Labor Market Discrimination Against Men uoith Disabilities in the Year of the ADA]; Marjorie 
L Baldwin & William G. Johnson, Labor Market Discrimination Against Men uoith Disabilities, 29 
HUM. RESOURCES 1 (1994) (comparing economic losses of disabled men between the years 
1972 and 1984); Marjorie L Baldwin eta!., Gender Differences in Wage Lasses from Impairments: 
Estimates from the Survey of Income and Program Participation, 29 HUM. RESOURCES 865 (1994) 
(measuring gender-based wage effects). 
88. See Marjorie L. Baldwin, Can the ADA Achieve its Employment Goals?, 549 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL & Soc. SCI. 37 (1997). 
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abilities from social welfare networks into the workforce. 89 Burkhauser 
points out that the success of these initiatives correlates directly to the de-
gree that any given national policy provides incentives or harbors expecta-
tions about disabled individuals' workplace participation. 90 
Although both Burkhauser's and Baldwin's work is laudable, their 
findings underscore the need for greater qualitative and quantitative study 
into how environmental factors effect levels of participation by disabled 
people in the workplace. Much research needs to be done toward under-
standing the extent and/or degree of disincentives that keep people with 
disabilities from the workplace. Catalysts to encourage the disabled's labor 
market participation should also be explored. Delving into factors exoge-
nous to the law will provide a richer and more complete knowledge base 
from which to develop policy initiatives. 
2. Alternative Metrics 
Exploring alternative measures by which to gauge Title I's success can 
also enhance our understanding of tlie post-ADA employment experiences 
of workers with disabilities. Other metrics could include research into em-
ployment effects upon individuals with particular types of disabilities and/or 
those employed outside the traditional labor market. 
The currently utilized gauge directly links the ADA's efficacy to aggre-
gate employment rate levels. Thus, it lacks sufficient nuance to yield more 
than a cursory (albeit serviceable) understanding.91 Accordingly, the overall 
post-ADA employment rate for people with disabilities, as reported in the 
employment and wage effect studies, paints a universally dismal picture. 92 
Accordingly, it should provoke concern and examination. 93 At the same 
time, however, SIPP data indicates an increase in the overall employment 
level of individuals with "severe" disabilities from 23.2% in 1991 to 26.1% 
in 1994.94 If we believe the sociological95 or empirical96 studies that corre-
89. See, e.g., Richard V. Burkhauser, Post-ADA: Are People with Disabilities Expected to Work?, 
549 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL & Soc. SCI. 71 ( 1997); Richard V. Burkhauser & Petri Hirvonen, 
United States Disability Policy in a Time of Economic Crises: A Comparison with Sweden and the Federal 
Republic of Germany, 67 MILBANK Q. 166 (Supp. 2, pt. 1, 1989). 
90. See generaUy Burkhauser, supra note 89; Burkhauser & Hirvonen, supra note 89. 
91. A recent paper by a Census Bureau member corroborates this point. See John M. 
McNeil, Employment, Earnings, and Disability Quly 3, 2000), available at http://www.census.gov/ 
hhes/www/disable/emperndis.pdf. See also Baldwin & Johnson, Labor Market Discrimination 
Against Men with Disabilities in the Year of the ADA, supra note 87 (asserting that the debate pre-
ceding the ADA's enactment was not based upon empirical estimates that could be subse-
quendy used to measure future performance). 
92. Discussed supra Part III. For a less bleak picture, see Schwochau & Blanck, supra note 
43; Peter David Blanck, Studying Disability, Employment Policy and the ADA, in AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE lAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS, 
supra note 8, at 209. 
93. See generaUy Stein, Employing People with Disabilities, supra note 8. 
94. Compare CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COM., P70-61, CURRENT POPULATION 
REPORT 3 fig.3 (1997), u.Uh CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COM., P70-33, CURRENT 
POPULATION REPORT 12 fig.6 (1993). 
95. See, e.g., Harlan Hahn, Advertising the Acceptably Employable Image: Disability and Capi-
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late severity of disability inversely to likelihood of employment, this rise 
translates into an increase of 800,000 of the most difficult to employ indi-
viduals in the workforce. 97 Tracking the workplace experiences of severely 
disabled individuals, either longitudinally or periodically, could yield 
knowledge as to why their employment gains are more favorable than those 
of people with disabilities in the aggregate. Further quantitative research 
might, for examJ>le, shed light on whether or how type of disability, 98 edu-
cation,99 race, 10 and technological facility101 affect labor market participa-
tion rates. At the same time, in-depth qualitative study could provide in-
formation about the types of corporate cultures most conducive to hiring or 
retaining employees with disabilities, 102 as well as the decisionmaking proc-
ess disabled workers en~ge in when determining whether to enter or re-
turn to the workplace. 10 Examination of this cohort could also build upon 
talism, 15 POL'Y STUD. J. 551 (1987). 
96. See, e.g., Pamela Loprest et al., Gender, Disabilities, and Employment in the Health and 
Retirement Survey, 30 HUM. RESOURCES S293 (1995). 
97. See Current Population Survey, supra note 4. 
98. See generally Walter Y. Oi, Disability and a Workfare-Welfare Dilemma, in DISABILITY AND 
WORK: INCENTIVES, RlGfiTS, AND 0PPORTUNmES 31 (Carolyn L Weaver ed., 1991) (corrobo-
rating type and severity of functional limitation to likelihood of gainful employment). For 
another challenge to Oi's inverse scale, which has become paradigmatic in much of the reha-
bilitation literature, see DAVID S. SALKEVER & MARISA E. DOMINO, WITHIN GROUP 
"STRUCTURAL" TESTS OF LABOR-MARKET DISCRIMINATION: A STUDY OF PERSONS WffH 
SERIOUS DISABILrriES (Nat'! Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 5931, 1997) (pos-
iting from a national sample of adults with "serious" disabilities a direct correlation between 
severity and probability of employment). 
99. See generally Wallace Hendricks & Emir Broadbent, Labor Market Outcomes for Persons 
uoith Ltmg Term Disabilities and Colkge Outcomes, INDUS. REL (forthcoming publication, on file 
with author) (finding mixed correlative results in light of an absence of data regarding indi-
vidual productivity and the effects of prejudice). See also 1998 National Organization on Disabil-
ity/Harris Survey of Americans uoith Disabilities, avaikzble at http://www.nod.org/pressurvey.html 
(reporting that in 1986 39% of the disabled polled had not completed high school, as com-
pared with 20% in 1998). 
100. One study of physically disabled women, for example, found that only 25% of black 
women with disabilities were employed as compared to 44% of white women, 57% of black 
men, and 77% of white men with disabilities. See William john Hanna & Elizabeth Rogovsky, 
On the Situation of African-American Women u•ith Physical Disabilities, J. APPUED REHAB. 
COUNSELING, Winter 1992, at 39 (special issue). See generally jOHN BOUND ET AL, RACE 
DIFFERENCES IN LABOR FORCE ATTACHMENT AND DISABILITY STATUS (Nat'! Bureau of Econ. 
Research Working Paper No. 5536, 1996) (correlating effects of disability and racial status to 
labor market participation). 
101. See generally ALAN KRUEGER & DOUGLAS KRUSE, LABOR MARKET EFFECTS OF SPINAL 
CORD INJURIES 1NTHE DAWN OF THE COMPUTER AGE (Nat'} Bureau ofEcon. Research Working 
Paper No. 5302, 1995) (finding a strong correlation between computer technology and likeli-
hood of employment). 
102. See BLANCK, COMMUNICATING THE ADA, supra note 10, at 10 (discussing in-depth 
studies conducted before and after implementation of Title I of the ADA). 
103. See Lata Chatteljee & Monil<a Mitra, Evolution of Federal and State Policies for Persons 
u•ith Disability in the United States: Efficiency and Welfare Impacts, 32 ANNALS REGIONAL SCI. 347, 
361 (1998) (asserting that public policy measures exert work disincentive pressures against 
disabled people). See generally Baldwin, supra note 88; Richard V. Burkhauser, Post-ADA: Are 
People u•ith Disabilities Expected to Work?, 549 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL & Soc. SCI. 71 (1997) 
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earlier accommodation cost studies by yielding evidence about the percent-
age of individuals with severe disabilities requiring accommodations, the 
cost of all requested accommodations, and the dynamics underlying em-
ployer compliance (both voluntary and involuntary) in providing accom-
modations. These types of enquiries, which have been rare because they fall 
outside the traditional labor market model, would provide added informa-
tion and insight to an area in need of greater clarity.104 
A practical example of utilizing an alternative metric to assess post-
ADA employment effects on disabled workers is offered elsewhere in this 
volume by members of the law, Health Policy & Disability Center.105 
Blanck and his colleagues studied the employment experiences of entre-
preneurs with disabilities (EWD study). This is an infrequently examined 
group 106 despite the fact that the disabled are about twice as likely to be 
self-employed as their nondisabled peers. 107 Among the findings of the 
EWD study, one especially underscores the value of using metrics outside 
the traditional model. Small business owners were often willing to provide 
accommodations because of first hand experience with disabled workers' 
capabilities.108 Under the neoclassical labor market model, rational em-
ployers are unwilling to ·hire workers with disabilities because of their in-
nately lower efficiency. This disincentive should be compelling in the ab-
sence of a statute or regulation preempting employers' considered personal 
choices and directing that disabled applicants be hired, retained, or pro-
moted. 109 Because many, if not most, small businesses fall beneath the fif-
teen employee requirement of Tide I's employment provisions, 110 the tra-
ditional paradigm would reckon small business owners among the employ-
ers least likely to hire workers with disabilities. Nevertheless, the EWD study 
demonstrates that employers' personal experience with disabled workers 
was often a sufficient motive to include disabled individuals in their work-
forces.1.11 As such, the ~ study corroborates the findings of nvo previous 
(commenting on disability policies). 
104. See generaUy Frederick C. Collignon, Is the ADA Successful? Indicaturs for Tracking Gains, 
549 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL & Soc. SCI. 129 (1997) (suggesting alternative tracking indicators 
for employment and income). 
105. See generaUy Blanck et al., The Emerging Workforce of Entrepreneurs with Disabilities, supra 
note 2. 
106. But see SELF-EMPLOYMENT IN VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION: BUILDING ON LESSONS 
LEARNED FROM RURAL AMERICA (Nancy Arnold ed.), available at http://ruralinstitute.umt.edu/ 
rtcruraVSelEm/monograph!IntroSelEm.htm (reporting the results of utilizing self-employment 
in rural Montana as a vocational rehabilitation scheme). 
107. See FUTUREWORK, supra note 83. 
108. See Blanck et al., The Emerging Workforce of Entrepreneurs u>ith Disabilities, supra note 2, 
at 1572. 
109. See Stein, Labor Markets, supra note 8, at 34. 
110. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (1994) (stating that Tide I applies to employers with 
fifteen or more employees). 
111. See also John F. Newman & Roxan E. Dinwoodie, Impact of the Americans u>ith DisabiliJies 
Act on Private Sector Emplcyers, 20 J. REHABILITATION ADMIN. 3 (1996) (reporting on a study of 
20,000 private sector employers in Georgia, which found that employers lacked information 
about both the ADA and workers with disabilities). 
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analyses. The first found that newly disabled workers at large firms received 
accommodations. 112 The second, a review of Canadian workers covered by 
provisions similar to the ADA, reported the same.113 Taken together, these 
three examinations present a view of the dynamics underlying employers' 
decisions regarding workers with disabilities that is very different from the 
traditional labor market paradigm. Although subject to the same cypes of 
critiques leveled at earlier cost accommodation studies, 114 these analyses of 
alternative metrics provide important information not ordinarily garnered 
through traditionally directed research. 
CONCLUSION 
As part of a continuing research agenda into the conundrum of post-
ADA employment effects, this essay evaluated both accommodation cost 
and employment and wage effect studies. It is clear that, absent additional 
empirical evidence, neither the conclusions reached by these studies, nor 
my critiques, are dispositive. Operating from an expedient working as-
sumption that the studies examined were accurate, however, the implica-
tions of each set of findings were considered. The accommodation cost 
studies provide a means to recalibrate the metric by which employees with 
disabilities' economic efficiency is measured. The employment and wage 
effect studies raise important policy implications ifTitle I is, iin fact, causing 
a decline in the relative employment levels of disabled workers. I suggest 
that future research assessing post-ADA employment effects on workers 
with disabilities would benefit from examining aspects of employment poli-
cies beyond the traditional labor market paradigm. These considerations 
include the influence of environmental factors upon the ADA's efficacy and 
the use of alternative measures by which to gauge Title I's success. Making 
these enquiries will add insight to the continuing puzzle of whether the 
ADA really is "working," as well as tl1e attendant concern of what policies 
1 should therefore be pursued. 
112. See generaUy Nancy R. Mudrick, Emploj'111e11t Discrimination lau• for Disability: Utilization 
and Outcome, 549 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 53 (1997) (discussing the cos!S associ-
ated with accommodating disabled workers). 
113. See generaUy Morley Gunderson & Douglas Hyatt, Do Injured Worker.!- Pay for Reasonable 
Accommodation?, 50 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 92 (1996) (discussing the cost of accommodations 
for workers with disabilities and whether the burden falls on the employer or the employee). 
114. See supra Part II (setting forth these critiques). 
